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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
 
Michael Seibert pleaded guilty to production and 
possession of child pornography following a raid in which law 
enforcement agents recovered approximately 1,500 images. 
The District Court imposed a sentence of 360 months’ 
imprisonment, which fell within the Sentencing Guidelines 
range. On appeal, Seibert challenges his sentence on 
procedural and substantive grounds. Because the District Court 
did not commit a procedural error and Seibert does not satisfy 
his burden to prove substantive unreasonableness, we will 
affirm the sentence the District Court imposed. 
_____________ 
_____________ 
 3 
 
I.  
 
Seibert first started viewing child pornography a decade 
ago. He used several computers and a cell phone to view 
images and he stored them on flash drives, a SkyDrive cloud 
storage account, and several email accounts. He also 
participated in Internet chat rooms about child pornography 
and even created a Facebook profile depicting himself as a 
teenager to communicate with children. He spent years 
obtaining, producing, and storing child pornography. 
 
Approximately ten years ago, Seibert began to 
communicate with two teenage females. Over the next three to 
four years, he chatted with them via Internet chat rooms, text 
messages, and phone. Seibert convinced both to send him 
sexually explicit photos of themselves. His criminal activity 
did not end there—he also communicated with at least ten other 
minors and sent several nude images of himself to minors. 
 
After receiving a tip that child pornography was 
uploaded to a SkyDrive account, Homeland Security 
Investigations (“HSI”) began investigating Seibert in March 
2014. On July 2, 2014, law enforcement agents executed a 
search of his residence, where they seized computers and 
storage devices containing child pornography. At the time of 
the search, the agents also interviewed Seibert. He admitted to 
viewing and storing child pornography. Law enforcement 
ultimately recovered 1,525 images. 
 
On October 26, 2017, Seibert was indicted for two 
counts of production and one count of possession of child 
pornography. He eventually pleaded guilty to each count. In 
calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the 
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Probation Office recommended applying enhancements under 
U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(5) and 4B1.5(b)(1), resulting in a total 
offense level of 42. The Guidelines range amounted to 360 
months to life imprisonment. 
 
The sentencing hearing took place on June 6, 2019. 
While Seibert advocated for the statutory minimum sentence 
of fifteen years’ imprisonment, the Government requested 
thirty years, which is the low end of the Guidelines range. After 
applying the two enhancements and weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) sentencing factors,1 the District Court sentenced 
 
1 Pursuant to § 3553(a), the trial court must consider the 
following factors upon sentencing a defendant: 
 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . ; 
 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
 
(4) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range 
established . . . ; 
 
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . [;] 
 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct; and 
 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense. 
 5 
 
Seibert to 360 months’ imprisonment. Seibert filed a timely 
notice of appeal to challenge the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal 
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review Seibert’s final conviction and sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 
“[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited 
to determining whether they are reasonable.” Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The burden is on the party challenging the sentence 
to show that it was unreasonable. United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). The abuse of discretion 
standard applies to our reasonableness review. Id. Factual 
findings relevant to the Sentencing Guidelines are reviewed for 
clear error, and the District Court’s Guidelines interpretation is 
reviewed de novo. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). The District Court’s application of 
the Guidelines is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. McClure-Potts, 908 F.3d 30, 33 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 
III. 
 
Seibert claims that the District Court procedurally erred 
in its Guidelines calculation. He also argues that the District 
Court’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. We disagree.   
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A. 
 
District courts follow a three-step process to determine 
the appropriate sentence following a criminal conviction. 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). The 
sentencing court must “first calculat[e] the applicable 
Guidelines range[,] . . . then rule on any motions for departure 
and, if a motion is granted, state how the departure affects the 
Guidelines calculation[,] . . . [and finally] consider all of the § 
3553(a) factors and determine the appropriate sentence to 
impose.” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 194–95 (3d 
Cir. 2008). “[T]he Guidelines are only advisory, but they 
nonetheless provide the initial benchmark.” United States v. 
Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
On appeal, we first consider whether the district court 
committed procedural error, such as “improperly calculating[] 
the Guidelines range . . . [or] failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 
51). We then determine if the sentence is substantively 
reasonable. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2010). We focus on the “totality of the circumstances” and 
affirm a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”2 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567–68. Overall, our 
 
2 Procedural and substantive reasonableness are often 
interconnected as “procedural problems may lead to 
substantive problems.” Levinson, 543 F.3d at 195; see also 
United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting 
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reasonableness review focuses on “whether the record as a 
whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Grier, 475 F.3d at 
571.   
B. 
 
Seibert argues that the District Court procedurally erred 
by miscalculating the applicable Guidelines range. He 
specifically challenges the District Court’s concurrent 
application of the five-level enhancements under both § 
2G2.2(b)(5) and § 4B1.5(b)(1). In his view, the District Court 
engaged in improper “double counting” because the 
provisions’ language is identical, and each enhancement 
applied to the same conduct. 
 
In United States v. Reynos, this Court explained that 
“[i]mproper double counting occurs when a district court 
imposes two or more upward adjustments within the same 
Guideline range, when both are premised on the same 
conduct.” 680 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2012). However, double 
counting is permissible so long as the Guidelines do not 
explicitly prohibit simultaneous application of the provisions 
in question. See United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 212 
(3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that double counting of weapons 
enhancements “is permissible because it is explicitly mandated 
by the clear and unambiguous language” of the relevant 
Guidelines section); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 671 
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “an adjustment that clearly applies 
to the conduct of an offense must be imposed unless the 
Guidelines exclude its applicability”).   
 
that substantive issues in the case were “a product of the 
District Court’s procedurally flawed approach”).   
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We begin with the language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) and § 
4B1.5(b)(1) to determine whether the Guidelines prohibit their 
simultaneous application. Section 2G2.2(b)(5) provides for a 
five-level increase “[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of 
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” 
A pattern of activity is defined as “any combination of two or 
more separate instances” of sexual abuse or exploitation of a 
minor. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1. Section 2G2.2(b)(5) is an offense-
specific enhancement that “punish[es] a defendant for the 
specific characteristics of the offenses of conviction.” See 
United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 
Section 4B1.5(b)(1) is similar to § 2G2.2(b)(5) in some 
respects but ultimately addresses a separate sentencing 
consideration. This enhancement mandates a five-level 
increase for a “covered sex crime” in which “the defendant 
engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual 
conduct.” § 4B1.5(b)(1). The notes define a pattern of activity 
as, “on at least two separate occasions, . . . engag[ing] in 
prohibited sexual conduct with a minor.” § 4B1.5 cmt. 
n.4(B)(i). Because it pertains to the part of the Guidelines 
dealing with career offenders, § 4B1.5(b)(1) is more than an 
offense-specific enhancement. Dowell, 771 F.3d at 171 (noting 
that the enhancement “is located in Chapter Four of the 
Guidelines under the provisions covering ‘Career Offenders 
and Criminal Livelihood’”). It allows district courts to impose 
longer sentences when “the defendant presents a continuing 
danger to the public.” Id.3 
 
3 Seibert urges us to require district courts to identify the 
specific aims of the enhancements in order to simultaneously 
apply both. We decline to do so because neither the Guidelines 
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The Guidelines do not prohibit simultaneous 
application of these two enhancements. See id. at 170 (stating 
that applying § 2G2.2(b)(5) and § 4B1.5(b)(1) “to the same 
conduct was permitted because it was not expressly prohibited 
by the Guidelines”). In fact, the Guidelines expressly 
contemplate the application of both enhancements to the same 
conduct. See § 4B1.5(b)(1) (“The offense level shall be 5 plus 
the offense level determined under Chapters Two and Three.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Dowell, 771 F.3d at 170 (“[T]he 
[G]uidelines intend the cumulative application of these 
enhancements.” (quoting United States v. Schellenberger, 246 
F. App’x 830, 832 (4th Cir. 2007))). Therefore, even if the 
District Court applied § 2G2.2(b)(5) and § 4B1.5(b)(1) to the 
same conduct, it did not err because the Guidelines permit the 
simultaneous application of both enhancements. 
 
Moreover, the District Court applied the § 2G2.2(b)(5) 
and § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancements to different conduct. See 
United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 309 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(allowing simultaneous application of two enhancements 
where each “involves conduct which the other does not”). 
Regarding the § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement, the District Court 
explained that Seibert’s “production of child pornography with 
minor number one and minor number two constitutes a pattern 
of activity because each count represents a second occasion.” 
App. 109. Meanwhile, the District Court applied § 2G2.2(b)(5) 
to Seibert’s possession conviction because he possessed 
sexually explicit images of minors in addition to the two 
referenced in the indictment. Each enhancement covers 
dissimilar conduct against separate groups of minors. 
 
nor our precedent requires the sentencing court to make such a 
showing. 
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The District Court did not engage in impermissible 
double counting when it simultaneously applied the 
enhancements under § 2G2.2(b)(5) and § 4B1.5(b)(1). Not 
only did it apply each enhancement to distinct conduct, but the 
Guidelines allow for the simultaneous application of both 
enhancements even to the same conduct. The Court’s 
Guidelines calculation did not result in a procedural error. 
 
C. 
 
Seibert next claims that 360 months’ imprisonment is a 
substantively unreasonable sentence and that the District Court 
should have granted a downward variance.4 He argues that the 
District Court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors led to an 
unduly harsh sentence because it did not place enough weight 
on his personal circumstances. 
 
 
4 At certain points in his brief, Seibert seems to suggest 
that the District Court ignored the § 3553(a) factors, which 
would be procedural error. United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 
434, 444 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011) (identifying “fail[ure] to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors” as indicative of procedural error (quoting 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51)). However, since Seibert premises his § 
3553(a) arguments on the perceived inadequate weight 
afforded to those factors, and since the Court clearly applied 
the § 3553(a) factors, we construe these arguments as 
substantive rather than procedural challenges. Merced, 603 
F.3d at 217 (clarifying that the sentencing court’s “choice of 
sentence did not afford [the § 3553(a)] factors enough weight . 
. . is a substantive complaint, not a procedural one”) (emphasis 
in original). 
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In support of a downward variance from the Guidelines 
range, Seibert presented evidence detailing his personal history 
and characteristics, including the mental health, medical, and 
learning challenges he has long faced. In particular, Seibert 
submitted a psychological evaluation concluding that he “has 
the libido of an adult but the mind of a small child and does not 
have the capacity to use rationality to control his impulses.” 
App. 59. During the sentencing hearing, the District Court 
acknowledged this evidence but concluded that Seibert’s 
“family struggles” are not “unusually severe.” App. 171–72. 
The District Court thus declined to grant Seibert’s request for 
a downward variance from the Guidelines range to the fifteen-
year mandatory minimum. 
 
Seibert’s argument that the District Court abused its 
discretion by not affording enough weight to those factors is 
unavailing. As we have previously explained, “a district 
court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant 
contends they deserve” does not make a sentence substantively 
unreasonable. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d 
Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 243 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“The District Court’s decision to accord less 
weight to mitigation factors than that urged by [the defendant] 
does not render the sentence unreasonable.”). It is the trial court 
that “sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility 
determinations, [and] has full knowledge of the facts and gains 
insights not conveyed by the record.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561 
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We thus defer to the District 
Court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors. Bungar, 478 F.3d 
at 543 (noting that our review of a district court’s application 
of the § 3553(a) factors “to the circumstances of [a] case . . . is 
highly deferential”). 
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Seibert views the Guidelines ranges for child 
pornography offenses as too harsh and his conduct as less 
serious than that of other defendants who received similar 
sentences. It is not our role as a reviewing court to vacate a 
sentence within the Guidelines range due to policy 
disagreements with the Guidelines. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 574 
(“If abuse-of-discretion review cannot strike [the balance 
between reducing unjustified sentencing disparities and 
considering defendants as individuals], it is not our role as 
appellate judges to adjust the scales.”); see also United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (“The National 
Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long term, the 
sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that 
Congress judges best for the federal system of justice.”). 
Congress is best suited to make policy determinations 
regarding the appropriateness of the Guidelines ranges for 
child pornography. 
 
That is why defendants bear a “heavy burden [to show] 
that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range was 
substantively unreasonable.” See United States v. Fountain, 
792 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2015). Seibert does not satisfy his 
burden. He possessed more than 1,500 images of child 
pornography, admitted to exposing himself to others on dozens 
of occasions, posed as a teenager to coerce two children to send 
him sexually explicit images of themselves, communicated 
with other minors in the attempt to entice them to do the same, 
and even convinced a woman to send him pictures of herself 
having sexual contact with her seven-year-old daughter. The 
Guidelines ranges for child pornography offenses are high to 
deter individuals from the very activity Seibert engaged in. Cf. 
Goff, 501 F.3d at 261 (“The logic of deterrence suggests that 
the lighter the punishment for downloading and uploading 
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child pornography, the greater the customer demand for it and 
so the more will be produced.” (quoting United States v. 
Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007)). The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Seibert to 
the low end of the Guidelines range for his criminal conduct. 
Thus, we hold that Seibert’s sentence is procedurally and 
substantively reasonable. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment sentencing Seibert to prison for 360 months. 
